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Abstract
Designing an efficient protocol for avoiding the threat of recording based attack in presence of a powerful
eavesdropper remains a challenge for more than two decades. During authentication, the absence of any
secure link between the prover and verifier makes things even more vulnerable as, after observing a threshold
challenge-response pair, users’ secret may easily get derived due to information leakage. Existing literatures
only present new methodologies with ensuring superior aspects over previous ones, while ignoring the aspects
on which their proposed schemes cope poorly. Unsurprisingly, most of them are far from satisfactory − either
are found far from usable or lack of security features.
To overcome this issue, we first introduce the concept of “leakage control” which puts a bar on the natural
information leakage rate and greatly helps in increasing both the usability and security standards. Not just
prevention, but also, by introducing the threat detection strategy (based on the concept of honeyword), our
scheme “lights two candles”. It not only eliminates the long terms security and usability conflict under the
practical scenario, but along with threat detection from client side, it is capable of protecting the secret at
the server side under the distributed framework, and thus, guaranteeing security beyond the conventional
limit.
Keywords: Authentication, Password, Information leakage, Recording attack, Threat detection, Threat
prevention, Usability.
1. Introduction
Password base authentication is one of the simplest form of authentication as it reduces the human
effort to a great extent during the identity verification (Bonneau et al., 2012). Being usable, this factor of
authentication has been challenged under different kind of threats over the times (Marechal, 2008) (Pinkas
and Sander, 2002) (Kim et al., 2016) (Pan et al., 2016) (Halevi and Saxena, 2015) (Wang et al., 2016).
Though most of these threats have been successfully handled (Wang and Wang, 2016) (Manulis et al., 2016)
(Kontaxis et al., 2013), there are a few, particularly those which involve human intelligence factor, are con-
tinuously challenging researchers in developing some efficient algorithm to tackle the breaches. Recording
attack is one such security threat (on client side) which has severe impact on the password based authenti-
cation (Yan et al., 2015).
Threat model: Let a genuine user and adversary be denoted by H and A, respectively. During
registration, it is always assumed that H successfully submits her login credentials to a remote machine
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(identified as M) in a private environment. At the time of authentication, H sends her login information
to M by using a login terminal. Throughout an authentication session, with the help of some recording
devices (e.g., conceal camera), A may record the complete login information submitted by H. Later, she
may use that captured information to impersonate H. This kind of threat is known as observation attack,
more preciously recording attack, on the password based authentication. In this context, one important
aspect is number of observations that A can make, and based on this, the following two categories are
suggested in (Sun et al., 2016).
• Type 1: Video captures the entire authentication process only once.
• Type 2: Video captures the entire authentication process more than once (denoted as rmax times).
It is believed that while nature of the threat involving Type 1 adversary is opportunistic, Type 2 adver-
sary engages herself in a planned attack (Wiese and Roth, 2015). Though nature of A can really be either
of these in practice, but some salient researches in this direction select value of rmax no greater than 3 (Kim
et al., 2010) (Schaub et al., 2013) (Tari et al., 2006) (Schaub et al., 2012) (Zakaria et al., 2011). These
references will be particularly helpful during security analysis of our proposal.
Defense strategy: Defense to this threat model mainly relies on a basic principle of challenge (C) re-
sponse (R) protocol. During login,M sends C (or a puzzle) to H. Based on her original password (identified
as P), H then derives R with respect to C. Thus, we may roughly present R in the form of f (P, C). It
is important to note here that generated C by M varies in each authentication session, because of which
R also changes. Therefore passive key entry (i.e., submitting R instead of P) by H refrains A to get the
original password.
In this paper, we revisit the working principle of recording attack resilient passive key entry methods
that do not require any secure auxiliary channel, and study their security aspects. There is no denial of
the fact that no usage of auxiliary link mitigates the risk of different side channel attacks to a great extent
(Cˇagalj et al., 2015). Also, it helps H to login without being dependent on any additional hardware. But as
C is overtly communicated, therefore, due to information leakage (Yan et al., 2012), these methods cannot
withstand the exposure of too many authentication sessions.
Motivations and Contributions: After performing an exhaustive literature survey, we have found
that schemes that do not rely on a secure channel to address the considered threat model, end up being
unusable for most of the users (Hopper and Blum, 2001) (Bai et al., 2008) (Zhao and Li, 2007) (Weinshall,
2006). This in turn justifies the proposed claim1 by Yan et al. in (Yan et al., 2012).
Also, we have found that to address the password leakage from a compromised server (indicating to
server side threat), recently proposed threshold password-only authentication schemes (Camenisch et al.,
2015) (store password information over multiple servers, and thus no alliance of servers upto a certain
threshold can learn anything about the secret) are inherently unable to cope with the recording based
attack at the client side. Therefore, in order to address all the aforementioned security aspects, we have
made the following major contributions in this paper.
• Contribution 1: We propose a “two passwords based protocol”, namely TPP − in which a second
password is introduced as the “second line of defense”, that provides security against recording based
attack. The usage of two passwords here not only increases the overall security at the client side,
but also provides a distributed security framework to address the threat of password leakage from a
compromised server.
1To achieve both security and usability against considered threat model, a scheme must rely on a certain secure channel.
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• Contribution 2: We introduce a novel idea of controlling the information leakage rate explicitly.
Explicit control of information leakage helps in defeating A for more number of authentication sessions.
• Contribution 3: We show that “second line of defense” not only prevents, but also detects the
attackers’ activity to a certain extent to “light two candles with one flame”.
• Contribution 4: Along with the experimental survey, we also provide a theoretical analysis to mea-
sure the usability standard of the proposed approach. The usability study infers that proposed scheme
significantly reduces the workload and ensures almost same usability standard as of the legacy pass-
word authentication.
Roadmap: The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some basic information that will
be helpful to understand the proposed idea. Along with the concept of leakage control and threat detection,
Section 3 introduces the proposed methodology. Section 4 then deals with the storage mechanism of users’
password to fit into our proposal. A detailed security and usability analysis of the method is preformed
then in Section 5 and Section 6, respectively. Followed by this, Section 7 presents a detailed comparative
analysis of our scheme with the existing usable protocols in this direction. Finally, Section 8 concludes on
outcome of our contribution.
2. Preliminaries
This section deals with some relevant information and ideas that will be helpful to understand the
foundation of the proposed protocol. The discussion here will be directed through the following topics.
1. Target user.
2. Interaction between H and M.
3. Attack analysis and information leakage.
4. Basics behind the proposed thought.
2.1. Target user
Likewise existing state of arts in (Kwon et al., 2014) (Chakraborty and Mondal, 2014), the design of
the proposed TPP protocol here is based on the colors. We mainly use 4 colors to materialize the proposed
concept. However, as shown in (Kwon et al., 2014), for the color blind people (4.5% of the total population),
all 4 utilized colors in our protocol can be replaced by 4 symbols (like black, white, strips and dots).
Therefore, like legacy password, anybody can use our scheme, except the blind people.
2.2. Interaction between H and M
During registration, along with a username, H selects two passwords. From a password space of all
printable characters, the first password (P1) can be of any length (longer than a threshold value) decided by
M. According to our design, being of the length 4, the second password (P2) belongs to a password space
of 64 characters containing {A, B, ..., Z, a, b, ..., z, 0,1, ..., 9, *, #}. Both these passwords allow multiple
occurrences of any character.
In TPP, during login, along with the username, H transcribes P1 through the legacy user interface (UI)
as shown in Figure 1.
Enter username alice
Enter first password *********
Figure 1: Legacy UI accepts username and P1
After providing the aforementioned information, H indirectly inputs a secret bit from P2 by using the
proposed login interface detailed in Section 3.3. In a nutshell, TPP integrates the legacy UI with the
proposed idea in Section 3.3 for accepting H′s password information in two phases.
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2.3. Attack analysis and information leakage
As discussed earlier, the core of any user authentication system that does not involve any auxiliary
hidden link can be explained by a function of the form
f : P × C −→ R (1)
The absence of the hidden link together with considered threat model implies that the value of C in any
phase of authentication will not just be shared between H and M, but be fully accessed by A. Like any
other authentication system, we assume that no physical occlusion of user input is involved so that R is
fully disclosed to everyone. Thus, having full access to both R and C, a powerful eavesdropper can derive
a set of possible secrets containing the original P. The attack principle can be realized in the form of the
following function
g : R× C −→ S (2)
where the set S contains all possible H′s secrets including the actual P.
Let Si be the derived S by A after recording the ith authentication session. As values of R and C vary
in each session, consequently, S also differs. Thus, for two different authentication sessions, i and j, derived
Si and Sj become different. Therefore from the recorded footages of these two authentication sessions, A
can perform an intersection between Si and Sj to reduce the probable candidate elements.
Hence, the leaked information or information leakage after recording kth (> 0) authentication session
can be presented in the form of the following equation.
Leaked Information =
{
Sk if k= 1⋂i
k=1 Sk if k= 1, 2, ..., i
(3)
Above equation suggests that leaked information after each authentication session shrinks the search
space in favour of A. Let the entropy (Ma et al., 2010) of P be E . We denote the entropy of information
leakage, resulting in secret space shrinking in each session, as 4E (inevitably 4E > 0). Therefore, after
being used for dE/4Ee authentication sessions, P gets exposed to A. Under this situation, after utilizing it
for dE/4Ee authentication sessions, H needs to change her P.
Note 1: Premature attack − It is important to note here that after recording multiple sessions, A
may derive a small list of probable secrets. In future, if A does not get a chance to record any further
authentication session, then also she may try to login by using those secrets one by one, and eventually
discovers the actual P. Though this is a serious concern, but remains unaddressed in the existing literatures.
2.4. Basics behind the proposed thought
Discussion from the previous section reveals few important facts which may help in increasing the session
resiliency of a defense mechanism against the recording attack. To defeat A for more number of sessions,
M may
• expand of the secret space to increase E .
• minimize the leakage rate.
• make use of both.
To fulfil the first option, H requires to remember more information. But due to limited capacity of
human mind this is difficult to achieve. Therefore very little work follow this direction (Weinshall, 2006)
(Weinshall and Kirkpatrick, 2004). Methods that satisfy second criterion, often make login process complex
for H (Hopper and Blum, 2001) (Asghar et al., 2010). Complex login procedure threats practicality of an
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approach to be used by the common people. It is quite intuitive that third alternative, combining the first
two options, will not be able to maintain any kind of balance between the usability and security aspects.
Our study reveals the fact that easy to use methodologies suffer from high information leakage rate
(Kwon et al., 2014) (Roth et al., 2004). As a consequence, sometimes A becomes able to recover the secret
from a single session recording only. Thus, if leakage rate can be controlled then with the same usability
standard, session resiliency of a scheme can be hiked. In this paper, we have tried to achieve this. Due
to leakage control, let entropy of the saved information in each session be 4T (inevitably 4E > 4T and
4T > 0). Therefore, explicit control of information leakage improves the session resiliency as the following
equation stands. ⌈ E
4E −4T
⌉
>
⌈ E
4E
⌉
(4)
Control over 4T helps in managing the shrinking rate of the secret space. Next, we define the shrinking
factor which relates the number of recorded sessions to the likelihood of A successfully authenticating herself.
Definition 1. Shrinking factor is the rate of secret space shrinking after A records each authentication
session.
If A derives Si after recording ith (≥ 2) authentication session then shrinking factor (sf ) can be expressed
as
sf =
∣∣∣∣⋂i−1k=1 Sk∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣⋂ik=1 Sk∣∣∣∣ (5)
where |S| denotes cardinality of the set S.
Addressing the premature attack: For addressing the issue mentioned in the Note 1, the following
strategy to distinguish between H and A has been adopted.
• M stores the leaked information in the database after successful login attempt by H in an authenti-
cation session.
• In the immediate next session,M will construct few groups by using those obtained leaked information
from the previous session. The formed groups will be mutually exclusive while one of them will
definitely contain the original P.
• If submitted R in this session corresponds to any other group except one, holding the original P, then
M will detect that A is trying to login by using the recording footage (leaked information) of the
previous authentication session.
• On detecting this attack, M acts according to the security policy set by the system administrator.
Detection strategy here is influenced by the concept of another threat detection mechanism, namely
honeyword (false password) based authentication technique (Cohen, 2006) (ref. to appendix A), currently
is being used in many domains (Catuogno et al., 2015).
3. Proposed methodology
As P1 is transcribed through a legacy UI, thus it does not require any further introduction. In this
section, we mainly focus on how H makes use of the second password (P2) to defeat A from performing the
recording attack. Contribution in this section unfolds in the following three phases.
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• The first phase introduces Basic Color Identification Protocol (or BCIP) that (like any other method)
leaks the information in an unrestricted way and provides no security for detecting the threat.
• The second phase presents few basic principles for controlling the leakage rate and gives a direction
towards the threat detection.
• Lastly, on the basis of proposed principles, we have modified BCIP and shown that by restricting
the leakage rate, the revised scheme is capable of detecting the security breach with enhanced session
resiliency. The modified scheme has been named as Improved Color Identification Protocol or ICIP.
3.1. BCIP: Proposed strategy with convention
Processing the elements of visual interface: As mentioned earlier, in addition to two special symbols
∗ and #, password space of P2 is comprising of all the alphabets (in both the cases) and the non-negative
single digits from 0 to 9. To design the visual interface, M assigns all these characters to a 8 × 8 grid
by following a specific order (e.g., alphabets first in the alphabetical order, the digits thereafter and the
symbols at last). A convenient order helps H in locating her password character from the grid during login.
As stated in Section 2.1, we have used 4 colors for coloring the grid in BCIP. The color assignment in BCIP
is done by obeying the following rules
• Allotment of the colors follows no specific order.
• Each color appears on 16 different cells.
• Position of the colors changes in each round of an authentication session.
Mediums for communicating C: During authentication, M first sends C to H. Human only have
five traditional senses to obtain a stimulus: sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste. As long as an application
cannot encode an information by generating last two stimuli, thereforeM cannot make use of taste or smell
to transfer any information. As a result, sight, hearing and touch remain as possible candidates. Here, we
explore the visual channel to transfer C overtly from M to H.
Interaction between H and M: After entering the first password (P1) information, M sends an
integer value (t) between 1 and 4 (length of P2) to H, by means of a visual signal. Starting from the first
index, H then retrieves the character placed at tth index position of P2. Let the obtained character be
denoted by η (∈ P2). A reference to η is then used to generate R in each round of that authentication
session.
At each round, M randomly shuffles the allotments of the colors on the grid. To pass an authentication
round, H needs to identify the color appeared at the grid’s cell containing η. Let the identified color be ηC.
Login interface of BCIP contains 4 different color buttons which are used as the mode of H′s interaction
with the system. Each color button holds one of those 4 colors that has been used to color the grid. H then
presses ηC button to make M understand the identified color by her.
Login example: Let the chosen P2 by H be S7Ay. We also assume that − like the 6 digit PIN entry
method in (Floreˆncio et al., 2007), each authentication session in BCIP is comprising of 6 login rounds.
Without loss of generality, if H receives 3 as C, then the selected password character by her would be A.
Thereafter in each subsequent round of that session, H will submit that color which will appear on the
alphabet A on the grid. Figure 2 shows an instance of the login procedure in a session for the password
character A. We have used green, orange, red and yellow as 4 different colors to design BCIP.
Attack procedure and information Leakage in BCIP: From the recorded video, A first looks at
the color button pressed by H in each authentication round. Thereafter, A finds all those characters from
the grid which are of the same color as of that color button. Hence, the response of H from the first round
6
(a) Round 1: R is Green (b) Round 2: R is Red (c) Round 3: R is Yellow
(d) Round 4: R is Orange (e) Round 5: R is Green (f) Round 6: R is Green
Figure 2: Login example in BCIP: Above figure shows color responses by H for the password character “A” in each round
of the authentication session. The color button hit by H in each round is marked by a “∗” symbol.
confuses A among 16 possibilities. For the login example shown in Figure 2, leaked information after the
first round produces Sr1 containing {A, F, M, N, O, T, U, W, b, d, e, g, l, r, s, y}. Below we have shown
the leaked information at the end of each round for the specific authentication session, illustrated in Figure
2.
• First round: Leaked information Sr1 = {A, F, M, N, O, T, U, W, b, d, e, g, l, r, s, y}.
• Second round: Sr2 = {A, C, D, G, H, K, M, P, W, X, Y, a, b, c, d, h}. Leaked information Sr1 ∩ Sr2
= {A, M, W, b, d}.
• Third round: Sr3 = {A, B, G, M, S, U, V, W, Z, d, f, l, j, n, 2,7}. Leaked information Sr1 ∩ Sr2 ∩ Sr3
= {A, M, W, d}.
• Fourth round: Sr4 = {A, H, J, K, P, U, W, c, d, g, h, q, 0, 1, 2, 6}. Leaked information Sr1∩Sr2∩Sr3∩Sr4
= {A, W, d}.
• Fifth round: Sr5 = {A, K, L, Y, a, k, l, q, x, 0, 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, *}. Leaked information Sr1 ∩ Sr2 ∩ Sr3 ∩
Sr4 ∩ Sr5 = {A}.
Though very simple to use, but above example shows that BCIP cannot even withstand the exposure of a
single authentication session.
All the password characters in P2 are independent of each other and H only uses a single bit from P2
to pass through the BCIP. Thus, along with estimating the leakage rate in BCIP, next we will analyze the
security provided by a single password character against the recording attack.
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Estimating the leakage rate: We state that after analyzing an authentication round, if A is confused
among m (> 1) possibilities then the next round has probability 1-PDisclosure of containing enough infor-
mation to guard the secret of being leaked. Here PDisclosure is the probability associated with: in a round,
none (inevitably except the original password character) of the m-1 probable elements from the previous
round gets the same color as of the original password character. PDisclosure can be formalized by using the
following equation.
PDisclosure =
m−1∏
k=1
(64− k)− (m− 1)
64− k (6)
It is quite obvious that after recording the 1st round, A derives m (here 16) probable elements. This
implies that in the next round, the color of the original password character must appear on at least one
of the remaining 15 characters from the first round to obfuscate A. This yields the value of PDisclosure as
0.007. Therefore, at the end of second round, without any leakage control mechanism, BCIP can guard the
password character of H with the probability 0.993. But as the value of m goes low down the propagation
of each login round, hence, after recording a complete session, chances of revealing the actual password
character becomes significantly high.
Simulating the strength of BCIP against recording attack: Figure 3 shows the effect of infor-
mation leakage on BCIP while experimented for a hundred authentication sessions. We found that in 92%
of scenarios, BCIP cannot even protect the secret for a single authentication session. For rest of the cases,
the secret has been protected for two authentication sessions only.
Figure 3: On an observation of 100 authentication sessions, above figure shows session resiliency of BCIP under the recording
attack.
Discussion 1: Pitfalls of BCIP− Proposed BCIP works on a simple idea of color identification to
authenticate a genuine H. Though the scheme is easy to use, but it is too weak to handle the recording
attack. It is also obvious that from the submitted R, BCIP cannot distinguish between a genuine user and
the eavesdropper.
3.2. Basic Principles For Leakage Control And Threat Detection
For the leakage control and threat detection, M adopts the following strategy.
• Sets the value of shrinking factor as sf (> 1).
• From the valid R in the first authentication session,M builds an initial group of X elements to confuse
A among X probable candidates.
• From the next session onwards, M does the following.
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– Determines the cardinality of each subgroup as Y = X/sf .
– Builds dX/Ye subgroups from those X elements of the previous session in such a manner so that
generated subgroups are mutually exclusive.
– Assigns a unique key (here color) to each subgroup in each round of the authentication session.
– Selects the subgroup containing the original password character, only after H successfully passes
all the authentication rounds.
– In the database, replaces the group of X elements (obtained from the previous session) by the
elements of the selected subgroup.
– Updates the value of X as: X ← Y.
Leakage control and threat detection: From the first session, let M groups X (> 1) elements in
such a manner so that each element from that group appears as a probable secret to A. Therefore, after
recording the first session, X elements create an illusion in A′s mind. As recording attack threats security of
a system only after A records atleast one authentication session, thus any threat detection strategy would
not be able to differentiate between the submitted R by H and A in the first authentication session.
From the recorded footage of the first session, A remains confused among X elements. Now, with the
goal of minimizing the probable secret space, A can proceed for the recording attack in the second session.
To resist A in this session, M does the following trick. From the X elements in the first session, M creates
few subgroups of cardinality Y = X/sf . During assignment of a key (e.g., color) to each subgroup,M takes
care of the following principles.
• Each subgroup must get a unique key.
• Because of the key, generated R must be unique with reference to the each subgroup.
Such an assignment of keys plays a dual role to resist and detect the recording attack.
Leakage control and threat prevention: Let the cardinality of each subgroup in a session be Y (> 1).
From the recorded footage of the previous session, A will certainly be able to identify each subgroup . But
deterministically, she would not be able to spot that subgroup containing the original password character.
Now each subgroup holds a different key, which also makes an impact on R. Therefore, after recording R
by the genuine H, though A can identify the proper subgroup holding the original password character, but
remains confused among the Y probable candidates belonging to that subgroup. Thus, grouping of objects
successfully controls the information leakage rate to defeat A for more number of authentication sessions.
Threat detection: After recording a session, if A tries to login in the next session then her first task
would be to identify each subgroup made of those X elements from the previously recorded session. Identify-
ing the subgroups would not reveal any clue about the original password character and hence, each subgroup
will seem to be equally likely to A. Let the number of subgroups be Gn (> 1). This obfuscates A among Gn
possibilities. Due to the key assignment property, each subgroup generates a unique sequence of responses.
Therefore from the submitted R,M will be able to identify the intended subgroup. As a result, if A chooses
a wrong subgroup (not containing the original password character) and gives her responses accordingly, then
M can detect the threat with the probability (Gn − 1)/Gn. After detecting the A′s activity, M may block
that account depending on the security policy.
Discussion 2: Formalizing the threat detection and leakage control−With the change in value of X
(updated as X ← X/sf in each session),M follows the same strategy for leakage control and threat detection
in the subsequent sessions. A gets the original password character only after recording a session where each
subgroup holds a single element. This can be formalized as; grouping of possible response elements can
resist and detect the attack for 1 + dloginit(X )sf e and dloginit(X )sf e authentication sessions, respectively; where
init(X ) denotes the initial value of X after recording the very first authentication session.
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Discussion 2 shows that values of init(X ) and sf play a big role in achieving the desired security objec-
tives. Therefore, next we discuss the exact relationship between these two parameters.
Discussion 3: Formalizing the relationship between X and sf− By setting a large initial value of
X , M can partially fulfil the criterion of defeating A for more number of authentication sessions. To earn
more session resiliency, M should also set a small value of sf. Therefore security against recording attack
(SR) is influenced by X and sf in the following manner
SR ∝ X
sf
(7)
In contrast, probability of threat detection (Pr[TD ]) goes high if M can create more number of subgroups
in a session. To create more subgroups, values of both X and sf must be increased which can be understood
in the form of the following equation.
Pr[TD] ∝ X · sf (8)
Therefore, due to contradictory nature of sf, we must balance both these values (e.g., large value of X and
moderate value of sf ) in such a manner so that both the threat detection and prevention strategies can
complement each other.
3.3. ICIP: Revised strategy with the leakage control
Discussion 1 from Section 3.1 infers that BCIP leaks too many information, and thus, most of the time
cannot even protect the secret under a single session recording attack. Like BCIP, each character of P2 in
ICIP participates independently in an authentication session. Therefore, we will focus on a single password
character to demonstrate the mechanisms of the leakage control and threat detection. Prior to elaborating
the proposed leakage control technique, it is important to note here that BCIP and ICIP differ only in
terms of processing the elements of visual interface. The all other aspects (e.g., password space, medium for
communicating C etc.) remain same.
Forming the initial group of init(X ) elements: We have used 4 colors (resemble to the keys in
Section 3.2) to color 64 elements. Because of the uniform distribution of colors, each color gets assigned
to 16 elements. The elements that get the same color in the first round, create a group for that entire
authentication session. Thus ICIP forms 4 groups of cardinality 16 in the first round and ensures that for
remaining rounds in that session, all elements belonging to a group acquire the same color. If received R
by M in each round matches with the color of the group containing the original password character then
M validates the prover. After successful login operation by H, the database stores all the elements of the
group holding the actual secret bit.
Discussion 3 shows that to make A′s job difficult, selecting the proper values for init(X ) (here 16) and
sf is absolutely important, and our next discussion (ref. to Discussion 4) focuses on this.
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(a) Round 1: R is Orange (b) Round 2: R is Green (c) Round 3: R is Yellow
(d) Round 4: R is Orange (e) Round 5: R is Orange (f) Round 6: R is Green
Figure 4: Login example in ICIP: Color responses submitted by H for the password character A in each round of the first
authentication session. The formed group here {A, D, G, J, L, d, e, f, l, o, v, x, y, 0, 6, 8 } holds the original password
character in each round. The color button hit by H in each round is marked by a “∗” symbol.
Discussion 4: Choosing the balanced values for X and sf−We have analyzed that if values of init(X )
and sf can be related in the form of the following equation,
(sf)d = init(X ) where d ∈ Z+ (9)
then the following facts stand
• Except the first, the detection probability of the recording attack in each session becomes sf−1sf (in-
evitably sf> 1).
• Including the first one, a method can defeat A for 1+ loginit(X )sf authentication sessions.
Thus for init(X ) = 16, if we choose a moderate value of sf as 4, (as 42 = 16) then ICIP performs reasonably
well as each password character can hide the secret for 3 authentication sessions and detect the recording
attack with a probability 0.75.
In Figure 4, we have shown the pictorial view of the login steps for the password character A, when index
of this character is used for the very first time in an authentication session by M.
Bypassing the attack in the first session: Figure 4 shows that the original password character of
H always belongs to a group comprising of {A, D, G, J, L, d, e, f, l, o, v, x, y, 0, 6, 8}. These 16 elements
hold the same color and therefore color responses by H obscure A among init(X ) = 16 possible candidates
after recording the first session.
Leaked information: Leaked information after capturing the first session become; S1 = {A, D, G, J,
L, d, e, f, l, o, v, x, y, 0, 6, 8}.
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(a) Round 1: R is Green (b) Round 2: R is Yellow (c) Round 3: R is Orange
(d) Round 4: R is Red (e) Round 5: R is Green (f) Round 6: R is Orange
Figure 5: Login example in ICIP: Color responses submitted by H for the password character A in each round of the
second authentication session. The subgroups are {A, G, y, 0}, {D, J, f, l}, {d, o, v, 8} and {L, e, x, 6}. In each round,
each subgroup gets a unique color. The color button hit by H in each round is marked by a “∗” symbol.
Database update: Including the original password character A, ICIP stores all these 16 elements in
the database .
Bypassing the attack in the second session: While password character A is being used for the
second time, 16 elements from the database are equally distributed among 4 subgroups in a random manner.
Therefore each subgroup contains Y = 4 (derived as Y = X/sf) elements in it. In Figure 5, we present the
user authentication for the second session. The randomly formed subgroups by M here are {A, G, y, 0},
{D, J, f, l}, {d, o, v, 8} and {L, e, x, 6}. In each round of this authentication session, each subgroup gets a
unique color.
Leaked information: It is quite understandable that as each subgroup in the second session contains
4 elements, thus, after recording H′s response in the second session, A will remain confuse among 4 possible
candidates. Therefore leaked information, S1 ∩ S2 yields to {A, G, y, 0}.
Probability of threat detection: If A does not get a chance to record any further login session after
recording the first authentication session, then with the 16 probable elements from the previous session, A
may try to impersonate the genuine H in the second session. From the visual interface, A first recognizes
each subgroup on the grid. But identifying the subgroups only is not sufficient as A does not know which
of them is containing the original password character. As each subgroup holds a unique color therefore,
generated sequence of responses for each of them will be different. Thus, if A selects a wrong subgroup, not
holding the original password character, then from the received R, ICIP can detect the recording attack
with a probability of 3/4.
Database update: After successful login by H in the second session, M replaces previously stored 16
elements by the group of 4 elements; A, G, y and 0.
Bypassing the attack in the third session: In this session, ICIP generates 4 subgroups and each of
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(a) Round 1: R is Red (b) Round 2: R is Green (c) Round 3: R is Orange
(d) Round 4: R is Green (e) Round 5: R is Green (f) Round 6: R is Orange
Figure 6: Login example in ICIP: Color responses submitted by H for the password character A in each round of the third
authentication session. The formed subgroups here are {A}, {G}, {y} and {0}. In each round, each subgroup gets a unique
color. The color button hit by H in each round is marked by a “∗” symbol.
them contains a single element from the set {A, G, y, 0}; where Y = 1, X = 4 and sf = 4. In Figure 6, we
have shown the login steps that H follows in the third session. Here also, each subgroup gets a unique color.
Leaked information: At the beginning of third authentication session, A, who already has recorded
footage from the previous two authentication sessions, remains confused among the 4 elements. After
recording the submitted R in the first round only, A can deterministically extract the original password
character as each of those 4 elements (create confusion initially) holds a unique color. Hence S1 ∩ S2 ∩ S3
reveals {A}. Therefore leakage control strategy can guard a original password character upto 3 authentication
sessions.
Probability of threat detection: Before recording the third session, derived elements from the first
two sessions creates confusion among 4 possibilities in A′s mind. Therefore, if A tries to login using the
recorded footages from the previous two authentication sessions then chances of threat detection still remains
as 3/4.
Database update: After successful login by H in the third session, M replaces the previously saved
four characters by the original password character.
Note 2: Strength of ICIP − By virtue of its design, for P2 of length 4, ICIP can defeat A for
3× 4 = 12 authentication sessions. Also, before its utilization in second/third authentication session, each
character in P2 can detect the threat with the probability 3/4.
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4. Password Management Policy
As mentioned earlier, proposed TPP here includes two passwords (P1 and P2) to raise the security bar
at both the client and server sides (see detail in Section 5). To reinforce the security at server side,M stores
P1 and P2 in two different servers. Though P1 can be stored by following the conventional password storage
mechanism, but P2 needs to store some additional information to fit into the security features of ICIP and,
next we will elaborate on this.
All the recording attack resilient methodologies maintain password in the plaintext format (Yan et al.,
2012) and proposed ICIP is no exception of that. In addition to the username and P2 (in plaintext), ICIP
maintains the group/subgroup information in the database. This is shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Maintained database by ICIP for username alice and password S7Ay.
H P group-1 group-2 group-3 group-4
alice S7Ay S null ADGJLdef GRy#
lovxy068
In the database, group-i can be related to the password character at ith index. The database shows that
first character has already been used for three times and hence index value 1 must not be used as a challenge
for any further authentication session. As a challenge, index values 3 and 4 can be used for two and one
more authentication sessions, respectively. The database also infers that index value 2 has never been used
by M and therefore this index value can be used for 3 times for authenticating H. Proposed scheme will
notify H to change her password (P2) once M makes use of all the index values for 3 times. Table 1 shows
that ICIP incurs some storage overhead.
Many password systems, particularly for government and industry users, storeH′s old password− usually
the last 10, as stipulated in, e.g., (Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) for the Department of
Defense , DoD). When H changes her P, she is prohibited in such systems from reusing any stored ones.
Many recent literatures argue that instead of storing old P on a per-user basis, it would be better to record
previously used P across the full user population (Juels and Rivest, 2013). A newly created password that
conflicts with any password in this list may then be rejected. Instead of storing password in the password-
list explicitly, M may use a Bloom filter (Broder and Mitzenmacher, 2004) which would not reveal these
passwords directly and sufficiently reduces the storage cost. In this way, the storage overhead of ICIP may
be compensated.
5. Security Analysis
Proposed TPP makes use of two passwords P1 and P2 for strengthening the security standard from
many aspects. This section first captures the A′s activity at server side and illustrates how our scheme
performs there to defeat the adversary. Then the focus is shifted towards the client side threat and the
defense mechanisms adopted by the TPP for protecting the users’ credentials.
5.1. Managing the server side threat
The systems − maintaining the login credential of the clients in a single server, often suffer from password
leakage once A gets access to this server. Though advanced techniques like bcrypt (Provos and Mazieres,
1999) provide some relief, but they were never designed to save the passwords against efficient password
cracking attacks, even if the passwords are maintained in the hashed format (Ma et al., 2014). Researchers
recently have shown that switching towards the distributed environment for storing the passwords can
greatly help to address this kind of threat as the distributed framework is much harder to compromise as
a whole (Kontaxis et al., 2013). Under the distributed framework, M uses more than one server to store
the complete password information and as a result, one compromised server does not make A eligible for
impersonating the genuine H.
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Using the proposed TPP, as H uses two passwords P1 and P2 and, M stores these passwords in two
different servers (also discussed in Section 4), thus it makes A′s job far more difficult to breach the security
at the server side.
5.2. Managing the client side threat
Unlike the considered unidirectional threat at server side, A can perform different kind of attacks for
computing H′s secret at client side. The threats at client side primarily include
• Recoding attack.
• Guessing attack.
• Random key submission
As proposed ICIP here is a part of login routine (mode of entering R based on P2) and an influence from
the honeyword based authentication technique (HBAT), thus, the security analysis also incorporates HBAT
security features like security against DoS attack, multiple system vulnerability and flatness. Next, we will
show how proposed methodology provides security against these attack scenarios.
5.2.1. Evaluating the security standard against the primary threat models
Recording attack: We already have shown that against recording attack, ICIP can deterministically
prevent a password character upto the first round of the third authentication session. So for each authen-
tication session of 6 rounds, this attack can be prevented upto 13th round and thus, this scheme can save
a password character upto d 13/6 e = 3 authentication sessions. Therefore, though P1 immediately gets
compromised under the recording attack in a single session, but for P2 of length 4, TPP can defeat A for
4× 3 = 12 authentication sessions against this attack.
While Section 1 shows that most of the methods consider the practical value of rmax as 3, proposed
method here provides security far beyond that limit by setting rmax as 12.
Guessing attack: Let Prguess[P1] and Prguess[P2] be the probabilities of guessing P1 and P2, respec-
tively. Therefore, overall success probability of A to break the security of TPP under this attack can be
evaluated as Prguess[P1] × Prguess[P2]. Next we determine the values of Prguess[P1] and Prguess[P2].
• Evaluating Prguess[P1]: One may find 95 printable characters on a standard keyboard. Some of the
recent studies shows that H generally prefer to choose password of the length around 6 (Das et al.,
2014). Therefore for the password of that length, the default value of Prguess[P1] can be evaluated as
95−6 or 1.36× 10−12.
• Evaluating Prguess[P2]: Along with guessing P1, A need to guess a single password character from
the set of 64 elements to pass through an authentication session and thus, initially it may seem that
Prguess[P2] yields to 1/64. But A may follow a smarter strategy for guessing a single character of P2
which again can be divided in 3 scenarios
– Case 1: Guessing a character in P2 that is used for the first time − As the password
character here always belongs to a group of 8 elements, thus identifying that group only will make
A′s job done and the corresponding probability of that will be 8/64 or 0.125.
– Case 2: Guessing a character in P2 that is used for the second time − As the password
character here always belongs to a group of 4 elements, thus identifying that group only will make
A′s job done and the corresponding probability of that will be 4/64 or 0.0625.
– Case 3: Guessing a character in P2 that is used for the third time − As the password
character here always belongs to a singleton set, thus identifying that set only will make A′s job
done and corresponding probability of that will be 1/64 or 0.0157.
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Thus aforementioned discussion infers that likelihood of A being successful in performing the guessing
attack can achieve maximum value 0.17 × 10−12. On the other hand, the minimum probability for the
same yields to 0.021× 10−12. Therefore, proposed TPP here maintains a strong defense line to refrain A in
performing the guessing attack.
Random key submission (RKS): To perform this attack, instead of targeting the actual password, A
randomly presses the response keys to pass through an authentication session. Thus, while the probability
of hitting the same key sequences producing P1 becomes 95−6 (denoted as PrRKS[P1]), the probability of
shattering the second line of defense values in 4−6 (denoted as PrRKS[P2]), as the login interface of ICIP
includes 4 response keys only. Hence, the overall probability to break the system under this attack can be
represented as PrRKS[P1] × PrRKS[P2] which yields to 3.32× 10−16.
5.2.2. Evaluating the security standard against the HBAT threat models
As discussed earlier, proposed ICIP here is an influence from HBAT. There are three well defined secu-
rity parameters related to any HBAT (Juels and Rivest, 2013). Next we will discuss on how ICIP performs
against these attack scenarios.
DoS attack: Knowing the original password, if A can guess a honeyword then she may intentionally
submit that to mount DoS attack in order to block H′s account (Juels and Rivest, 2013). Let us assume
that A successfully records the first authentication session. Now, if the same password character of P2 is
being used in any of the subsequent sessions and, provided responses by A in that session justify a group not
containing the original password character then genuine user’s account may get blocked. Therefore, mount-
ing DoS attack becomes easy after A records the first session. But as there is really no such legitimate user,
A′s attempt is reliably detected when this occurs.
Multiple system vulnerability: This is a less practical attack scenario as it depends on few strong
assumptions (Erguler, 2016). Consider a scenario where H has used the same character of P2 for login in two
different systems. If A remains active for both these authentication sessions, then she derives two different
groups of 16 elements where each of these holds the original password character. As intersection between
these groups reduces the probable candidates, thus the security of ICIP is affected under this situation (ref.
to appendix B).
It is important to note here that multiple system vulnerability can threat the security of any recording
attack resilient methodology as the adversary gets a chance to record the same user information for more
number of authentication sessions.
Flatness: In HBAT, from the list of probable candidates, if A cannot differentiate between the origi-
nal password and honeywords then the probability of detecting the attack becomes high. After successfully
recording the first authentication session of H, ICIP still confuses A in identifying the subgroup representing
the original secret in the second/third authentication session. Thus ICIP well satisfies the flatness criterion.
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Discussion 5: Some remarks on the security standard of the proposed model− Proposed TPP
here successfully handles the recording attack as H may use the same login credentials for 12 authentication
sessions. Due to large password space of 95 printable characters, P1 leads this scheme towards providing
robust security against both the guessing attack and random key submission attack. Also, along with the
threat prevention, proposed scheme has a novel property of threat detection; which “lights two candles with
one flame”.
It is also meaningful to assume that with the knowledge of probable password characters, A will always
try to identify the correct subgroup rather choosing a wrong one. Therefore A′s mentality of mounting
DoS attack seems to be little unrealistic in this context. Launching the recording attack by the same A at
different places by targeting a particular H also looks way to practical as suggested in (Erguler, 2016) (also,
this will degrade security of any human identification protocol). Thus, by achieving the complete flatness,
proposed scheme here not only well satisfies almost all the realistic security aspects at the client side, but
also, it manages the threat of password leakage at the server side. Thus, by handling both the client and
server side threats efficiently, proposed idea here ensures the “security beyond the conventional limit”.
6. Usability analysis
In TPP, the submission of P1 requires no manipulation from H′s end and thus, it provides the same
usability standard as of the legacy password protocol. But in order to generate R with reference to C, H
needs to process P2 accordingly and this plays a major role in determining the overall usability standard of
the TPP. Therefore, (until specified explicitly) this section mainly focuses on the usability standard provided
by the ICIP.
We determine the usability standard of the ICIP both from the theoretical and experimental point of
views. As discussed in (Yan et al., 2012), the theoretical analysis here is independent of any particular
user set and hence the outcome remains static under any situation. The usability standard also includes
the HBAT usability parameters which are (a) system interference, (b) stress-on-memorability and (c) typo
safety.
6.1. Theoretical analysis:
This framework is mainly driven by two components − Cognitive Workload (CW) and Memory Demand
(MD). CW influences the login time and is measured against total reaction time (in seconds) required by
the atomic cognitive operations. There are four well defined atomic cognitive operations associated with a
human identification protocol, and these are
• (Single/Parallel) Recognition (Sternberg, 1969)
• (Free/Cued) Recall (Nobel and Shiffrin, 2001)
• (Single-target/Multi-target) Visual Search (Woodman and Chun, 2006)
• Simple Cognitive Arithmetic (Campbell and Xue, 2001)
Cognitive overload: From the visual challenge, sending the index value, H first performs a cued
recall to perceive her password character. The reaction time for cued recall (CR) can be obtained through
(0.3694+0.0383 × g × ψ), where g (default value is 1 here) denotes number of elements H requires to
remember for performing the login in a round (Nobel and Shiffrin, 2001) (Corbin and Marquer, 2008). ψ is
the ratio between the cued recall and single item recognition, and the default value of this is 1.969 (Nobel and
Shiffrin, 2001). For P2 of length 4, H has to perform cued recall once at the beginning of a authentication
session consisting of 6 rounds. Thus, average cued recall time for each round can be calculated as (CR/6)×
4 which yields α1 = 0.448× 23 or 0.299.
In order to derive a response, H requires to search the correct clue from a set of w (also refers as window
size) varying objects, displaying on the screen. During identification of a single target, the reaction time of
H can be formulated as α2 = 0.583 + 0.0529 × w (Woodman and Luck, 2004). By using ICIP, H needs to
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identify a color from a single static cell on the grid through out a session. Therefore, w can be assumed as
1 here which returns the value of α2 as 0.6359.
Above discussion infers that ICIP derives CW as α1 + α2 = 0.9349 for each round.
Memory demand: For MD operation, the cost of each scheme can be calculated as the ratio between
length of P2 and λop: where λop is the accuracy rate of corresponding memory retrieval operation within
a fixed memorization time. Since recognition is much easier than recall therefore, λop becomes 29.6% and
84.8% for recall and recognition, respectively (Hogan and Kintsch, 1971). Thus MD in ICIP can be calcu-
lated as 13.51, for the length of P2 as 4 and λop as 29.6%.
Finally, an overall score of human power, HP, can be derived as the product of CW for a session and
MD. Thus, HP for ICIP can be obtained as 0.9349× 6× 13.51 = 75.78, which is significantly less compared
to the existing protocols in this direction (see details Section 7).
6.2. Experimental analysis
To conduct experimental analysis, we took help from 93 participants (all having correct-to-normal eye-
sight) and identified this set of participants as P∗. The participants were capable of operating computers
and their age varied between 19 to 37. Among them, 18 participants were identified as skilled H as they
enjoy playing fast video games (Kwon et al., 2014). It is important to note here that according to the report
in (Teh et al., 2016), most of the studies in this area used a test group between 11 and 25, while very few
used a test group of 50 or more participants (Kambourakis et al., 2016). Therefore, we believe that a set of
93 participants will provide more base to our experimental study.
The analysis was conducted into two phases − training phase and test phase. In training phase, we first
gave the participants a quick motivation behind our work and demonstrated the working principle of the
proposed TPP. For illustrating the model, we used the 10 Desktops of our institute laboratory. Thereafter,
we asked each of them for login by using the predefined login credentials set by us. After each participant
performed the login, we gave them an entire day to use the proposed model (in the laboratory) for getting
habituated with it. In the test phase, we collected the test data for 5 days and each participant was allowed
to login for 3 times. Obtained login time from skilled H helped us to determine the accuracy of derived CW
for the ICIP in the previous section.
From 93× 3 = 279 login attempts, below we present some notable information/outcomes of our experi-
ment.
• The ratio between the skilled and non-skilled participants was 1 : 4 (approximately).
• 16 times participants failed to input P1 correctly.
• 23 times participants failed in generating the valid responses by using P2.
• Overall 28 times they failed to login using TPP.
• Particularly for ICIP, the average login time of the skilled participants was recorded as 1.31 (7.96/6)
seconds per round, close enough to the measured CW parameter with an allowable small difference
(Yan et al., 2012).
• The average input submission time during entering P1 (set as “anhour”) was obtained as 3.2 seconds
considering the successful login attempts only.
• The average successful secret submission time for all the participants was captured as 15.49 seconds
(for entering both the secret information P1 and P2).
After conducing the experiment we asked the participants to fill a feedback form to rate our proposed
model. The obtained feedback result was found promising and is presented in Table 2.
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Table 2: Recorded feedbacks from the 93 participants
Choices Agreed participants Percentage (%)
Love to use 19 20.43
Easy to use 26 27.95
Find usable 35 37.64
Bit difficult 8 8.6
Extremely difficult 2 2.15
Not sure 3 3.23
6.3. Evaluating ICIP under the HBAT usability features
System interference: If a honeyword based approach influences the password choice of H (e.g., forces
H to remember some extra information) then it significantly impacts on users’ convenience. As the proposed
model does not influence the password choice of H, thus system interference can be considered as negligible.
.
Stress on memorability: If a honeyword based approach influences the password choice then that
may put some burden on H′s mind as she may need to remember some additional information. This feature
also has severe impact on usability standard and proposed ICIP does not include this too.
Typo safety: A honeyword generation algorithm is called typo safe if typing mistake of H rarely
matches with any honeyword. Let us assume that response sequences generated by two subgroups in ICIP
are < Cg11 − Cg12 ...Cg15 − Cg16 > and < Cg21 − Cg22 ...Cg25 − Cg26 >; where Cgik symbolizes color response
corresponding to group i in the kth round. Without loss of generality, if we assume that the secret bit of
P2 is belonging to group 1 then H follows the response sequence < Cg11 − Cg12 ...Cg15 − Cg16 >. For any
authentication round i (1 ≤ i ≤ 6), as Cg1i and Cg2i always differ, thus a few typing mistakes will never yield
to < Cg21 − Cg22 ...Cg25 − Cg26 >. Therefore proposed ICIP is highly typo-safe.
Discussion 6: Some remarks on the usability standard of the proposed scheme− Theoretical
analysis shows that the second line of defense, ICIP, sets a very low value of human effort. Experimental
analysis suggests that the login time (for entering both P1 and P2) can be kept within a range of 9 − 17
seconds with an error rate around 10%. ICIP also meets with all the usability standards of a HBAT which
infer that proposed TPP as a whole is highly usable in practice.
7. Comparative Analysis
For comparing proposed TPP with the existing protocols, we only consider those methods which are
usable by atleast 80% of the users (as reported in the respective literatures). In contrast, hard to use
methods, like low complexity CAS (Weinshall, 2006) which demands 30 objects to be remembered by H or,
HB protocol (Hopper and Blum, 2001), requires cryptographic computation from H, have been kept outside
of this comparative study.
Table 3: Comparative analysis of methods in terms of security features. Session resiliency against recording attack for S3PAS
and CHC protocol are obtained from the analysis reported in (Yan et al., 2012). While security of PAS against recording attack
is taken from the analysis, made by Li et. al (Li et al., 2009). Variable s (≥ 0) in the above table denotes an integer value. LR
denotes number of login rounds in a session. ~ indicates except the first authentication session.
Method Secret Total Window Password Pr[RKS] LR Session Pr[Threat
length (`) elements (n) size (w) space /round resiliency detection]
CHC 5 112 83 1.341× 108 0.22 5 3 0
PAS 4+2s N/A 13 4.225× 105 0.25 4 9+s 0
S3PAS 4 94 94 7.9× 107 0.076 4 8 0
TPP 6+4 95 64 1.2× 1019 1.3× 10−12 ×0.25 1+6 12 0.75 ~
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Table 4: Comparative analysis of methods in terms of usability features. CW per round, for all the methods (except S3PAS) is
obtained from (Yan et al., 2012). For S3PAS, CW/round is calculated by following the same direction as mentioned in Section
6. LR indicates number of login rounds in a session.
Method LR Avg. login time Avg. login time Error rate (%) CW/round MD HP = CW × LR
skilled user (sec) (sec) all user all user (sec) ×MD (×102)
CHC 5 56 65.5 17.1 9.326 16.89 7.87
PAS 4 33.44 41.52 15.2 6.837 13.51 3.69
S3PAS 4 36.56 50.8 15.7 10.597 13.51 5.55
TPP 1+6 1.3 + 7.86 3.2 + 12.29 10.04 0.9349 20.27 + 13.51 1.45 + 0.7578
Because of involvement of human intelligence factor, providing good usability standard is a must criterion
of an adoptable human identification protocol. We compare TPP with three existing usable protocols (also
certified by the authors in (Yan et al., 2012)), Convex-Hull-Click (CHC) (Asghar et al., 2013), PAS (Bai
et al., 2008) and S3PAS (Zhao and Li, 2007). The experimental data (for usability analysis) were obtained
from participants belonging to P+ set: where P+ ⊆ P∗ and as of P∗, P+ maintains a steady ratio between
the skilled and non-skilled H around 1 : 4 for obtaining the unbiased results. Table 3 and Table 4 show
comparative study of the methods from the security and usability perspectives, respectively.
It is important to note here that submission of P1 does not demand any significant CW, but requires
some MD. Therefore, for the default length of P1 as 6, MD can be calculated as 20.27.
Along with Discussion 5 and Discussion 6 in the previous section, the comparative analysis shows that
proposed scheme stands strong in terms of fulfilling all the security aspects. Also, with a remarkable property
of threat detection, TPP attains the highest usability standard among all.
8. Conclusion
In this paper we have tried to break the chain of “Drawback-SmallImprovement-Drawback-SmallImprovement”
in the research domain of human identification protocol for addressing the threat of recording attack. Pro-
pose mechanism here not only reduces the human effort at a large scale, but also offers few security features
that are missing in the existing state of arts. The usage of two passwords contributes in enhancing the
security standard from many aspects like managing both the server and client side threats. To the best of
our believe, we, for the first time introduce the idea of honeyword into recording attack resilient unaided
human identification protocol design. Exploring the concept of honeyword for threat detection, ensuring the
security at both the (client and server) ends and extremely simple login procedure make the proposed idea
deployable in practice.
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Appendix A. . Honeyword based authentication technique (HBAT)
Once an adversary gets an access to a system, she may obtain the password file where login credential of
a registered user is maintained. After retrieving the password information, adversary may impersonate the
genuine user. To resist this kind of threat, system does the following trick. System first creates K− 1 (> 0)
fake passwords and stores those in password file along with the original password. Thus for username alex
and password as infosec, system may maintain the following list of passwords for K = 5.
trustin privsec infosec intrust secpriv
Together with username, the original password index (here 3) is maintained in a different file in a different
server, known as honeyChecker. Thus, compromised password file here obfuscates the adversary among K
possible options. Choosing a wrong password (honeyword), instead of original one, will send an incorrect
index value to the honeyChecker and through this the attack can be detected. In a nutshell, by creating
a distributed security environment, HBAT can detect the attack on the password file with a probability of
K−1
K .
Appendix B. . Evaluating Security against multiple system vulnerability (MSV)
To show the effect of multiple system vulnerability (MSV) on ICIP, we consider a base case (close to
practical) where an adversary is active over 2 different systems. Now if a user uses the same password
character for login in those two different systems then following are the probable cases which may threat
security of a password character under MSV.
After recording the first authentication sessions of a user during login into both the systems,
an adversary derives two different lists probable candidates. Both these lists contain the original password
character. Finding more than one common elements between these two lists restricts A to derive the
original secret deterministically. Hence, the success probability of A becomes PDisclosure = 0.007; where
value of PDisclosure has been derived from the Equation 6 by taking m as 15.
Adversary may record second authentication sessions, while the same password character is used
for login purpose into both of those systems. To avoid the effect of MSV, adversary must find atleast two
common characters between the groups containing the original password character. For ICIP, probability of
this can be calculated as
Pr =
[
1−
15∏
k=1
63− k
64− k
]
× 1
4
(B.1)
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which yields to 0.06. Therefore, effect of MSV may proven to be catastrophic in this scenario.
In anyway, as adversary gets to know the exact secret while a password character is used for the third time,
hence it wouldn’t be much meaningful to derive the effect of MSV after recording the third authentication
sessions.
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